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ABSTRACT 
 
High profile corporate collapses of the past decade have undermined the integrity of financial reporting.  
Earnings management has been of growing concern to many academics, practitioners and regulators.  
Despite an enormous amount of regulation and standards governing the financial reporting process, 
earnings management practices are accelerating at an alarming rate in organizations today.  Fiji, like 
many other developed countries, has had instances of financial reporting failures.  One does not need to 
look further than the multimillion-dollar saga involving the state owned Bank, the National Bank of Fiji, 
which was the largest known financial scandal in the history of Fiji and the Pacific Islands.  This suggests 
that even emerging economies like Fiji were long ago, introduced to earnings management practices.  
However, this has not been apparent. Most studies on managerial incentives for earnings management, 
have been conducted in the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  Very few studies took place 
in emerging economies like Fiji.  This study uses a questionnaire-based approach to examine managerial 
incentives for earnings management among listed firms in Fiji, highlighting the most prevalent incentive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ecent corporate collapses such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance and the demise of Arthur 
Anderson have undermined the integrity of financial reporting.  Earnings management also known 
as creative accounting, income/earnings smoothing, financial engineering and cosmetic 
accounting has been a growing concern for academics, practitioners and regulators for quite some time.  It 
has also become a central issue to accounting research.  In the past, there have been instances of financial 
reporting failures in Fiji, such as the collapse of the state-owned bank, the National Bank of Fiji (NBF).  
The NBF’s case was the largest known financial scandal in the history of Fiji and the Pacific Islands 
(Grynberg et al., 2002).  The failure of this magnitude resulted from improper accounting practices, 
corruption and mismanagement.  Despite regulations and monitoring by the Reserve Bank of Fiji, the 
Auditor General and the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Fiji collapsed.  This collapse 
emphasizes the need for more policies that require adherence to good accounting practices and financial 
disclosures, sound corporate governance and robust banking supervision (Singh, 2008).  The NBF case 
suggests that emerging economies, like Fiji, have been introduced to earnings management practices long 
ago.  However, this introduction was not apparent. 
 
Corporate collapses and prior studies (Healy, 1985; McNichols and Wilson, 1988; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Nelson et al., 2002) have strongly suggested that earnings management is becoming a 
common business practice in most companies today.  This justifies the need to study earnings 
management practices in our economies. Such practices not only have an adverse impact on financial and 
investment decisions but also obscure a firm’s intrinsic value.  More importantly, we must also consider 
incentives that give rise to such practices. 
R 
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A large number of studies (DeAngelo, 1986; Cahan, 1992; Beneish, 2001; Singh, 2008) have been 
conducted to determining the managerial incentives for earnings management, most of which have 
focused on private sectors in developed economies such as USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand.  In emerging economies, such studies are rare and hardly pursued.  Due to the presence of 
institutional and regulatory differences between developed and emerging economies, it is not only 
difficult but also futile to generalize research results from studies in developed to emerging economies. 
 
Singh (2008) reveals that accounting standards in Fiji do not have a legal backing and has a weak 
regulatory environment that permits high levels of manipulation.  Our research contributes to earnings 
management literature by examining provisions in management policies and practices (for example, 
management compensation policies, forecasts, etc) of listed companies that actually create incentives for 
earnings management.  Additionally, we intend to identify the most prevalent incentive for earnings 
management amongst listed firms in Fiji.   
 
These findings will provide FIA and other standard setters in emerging economies evidence on the most 
common driver for earnings management, which should assist them in formulating relevant financial 
reporting and corporate governance policies to ensure that management makes adequate disclosures.  It 
should also assist users especially investors and financiers while reviewing annual reports to be cautious 
if the firm concerned displays characteristics that are aligned with the most prevalent incentives for 
earnings management.  Moreover, our findings would compel auditors to be more vigilant in the auditing 
process if their clients have policies and practices that would allow such incentives to take effect.   
 
The paper comprises of five sections.  Section 1 summarizes the literature review on the incentives for 
earnings management.  Section 2 outlines the research methodology adopted in the study and Section 3 
analyses and discusses the results of the study.  Section 4 outlines the conclusion and limitations. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
What is Earnings Management? 
 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported outcomes.”  Levitt (1998) defines “earnings management as a gray area 
where the accounting is being perverted, where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports 
reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company.”  
Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain.  Until today, there is no single 
universally accepted definition of earnings management.  A lack of consensus on the definition of 
earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that seek to detect 
earnings management, or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives (Beneish, 2001). 
 
With a substantial amount of regulation and standards governing the reporting process, how is it that the 
practice of aggressive earnings management is accelerating at an alarming rate in organizations today?  
The financial reporting process governed by GAAP allows managers with some level of flexibility in 
preparing their reports to ensure that the reports reflect relevant and reliable information.  Although, 
flexibility in financial reporting grants managers with the freedom to choose accounting policies and 
procedures, managers tend to misuse this freedom in altering the reported earnings in order to receive 
bonuses, avoid violation of debt covenants and so forth.  Leaving GAAP aside, our study attempts to 
discover if organizations have provisions in their management contracts and firm policies, which give rise 
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to earnings management practices.  We are undertaking an in-depth study of the policies of the firm in 
respect to earnings management incentives.   
 
Why does Earnings Management occur? 
 
Academics often use agency theory in describing earnings management behavior. Agency theory is 
simply the agency relationship that exists between management and shareholders.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) define agency relationship as "...a contract relationship where one or more persons (the principal) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent” (p. 6).  If both the principal and agent are utility 
maximisers, it is reasonable to believe the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.  
This divergence in interest of the two parties results in agency problems.  It is apparent that such 
problems arise because of asymmetric information between the agent (management) and the principal 
(shareholder and other stakeholders).  Management possesses a more complete set of organizational 
information relative to current and potential stakeholders as management not only makes day to day 
business decisions but also controls daily business operations.  Therefore, information asymmetry arises 
when management does not communicate all information, resulting in conflict between the privileged 
agents (management) and the remote body of stakeholders.   
 
Richardson (2000) found a positive relationship exists between the levels of information asymmetry and 
earnings management and hence provided empirical evidence suggesting that information asymmetry is a 
necessary condition for earnings management.  Consequently, increasing levels of information asymmetry 
makes it difficult for stakeholders to see through earnings manipulation as they lack the necessary 
resources, incentives or access to relevant information that would ensure effective monitoring of 
management actions, decisions and choices.  Therefore, agency theory provides a solid framework for 
understanding earnings management as it provides agents with economic incentives to manipulate 
financial results. 
 
Managerial Compensation Incentives 
 
One of the most common incentives for managing earnings is the manager’s remuneration package.  In 
most businesses, managers are entitled to cash bonuses or share options upon achieving predetermined 
reported earnings.  It is quite common for management employment contracts to include accounting based 
constraints that determine compensation opportunities, such as annual salary increases, bonus, 
performance evaluation, and reaching targets set in compensation contracts (Singh, 2008).   
 
Healy (1985), showed how upper and lower bounds on executive bonus packages encourage managers to 
make discretionary accounting accruals in a strategic manner.  Hence, compensation contracts specifying 
minimum levels of profits to grant bonuses provide incentives for income increasing or income 
decreasing earnings management depending on the actual level of profits attained in a particular period.  
Healy (1985) used accruals and changes in accounting procedures and found that managers choose 
income-increasing accruals as long as profits fall within the minimum and maximum boundaries.  
However, managers also tend to move towards income decreasing accruals if earnings are above the 
maximum level.  Gaver et al., (1995) extended Healy’s study by examining the relationship between 
discretionary accruals and bonus plan bounds using a sample of 102 firms for the period 1980-1990.  
They found that when earnings before discretionary accruals are below the lower bound, managers select 
income increasing discretionary accruals (and vice versa).  Gaver et al., (1995) thus believe that their 
results are more consistent with income smoothing hypothesis than with Healy’s bonus hypothesis.   
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Borrowing Cost Effects 
 
The firm’s closeness to violating its debt covenant provides its management with another incentive to 
engage in earnings management.  Mulford and Comiskey (2002) describe debt covenants as stipulations 
included in debt agreements designed to monitor corporate performance.  For instance, a lender might 
instruct that a certain value for an accounting ratio be maintained or impose limits to investing and 
financing activities.  If the borrower violates the debt covenant, the lender might increase the interest rate, 
requiring additional financial security, or calling for immediate repayment.  Therefore, debt covenants 
provide incentives for earnings management either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based 
constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations (Beneish, 2001).  According to 
Christie (1990), the closer a firm is to violating its debt covenant restrictions; the more likely it is for its 
managers to adopt income increasing accounting choices. 
 
Additionally, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) suggest that managers of firms reporting debt covenant 
violations in their annual report adopt income increasing accounting choices in the years prior to the 
violation.  Sweeney (1994) also finds that covenant violators manipulate earnings, but in the year(s) 
following rather than prior to the violation, indicating that earnings are not managed specifically to avoid 
violating a lending contract but to reduce the likelihood of violating them in the future.  However, Healy 
and Palepu (1990) find no such evidence of earnings management in their study of firms with binding 
debt covenants.   
 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) used a database of private lending agreements for USA firms in order to 
provide large sample tests of the debt covenant hypothesis.  They found an unusually small number of 
loans with financial measures just below covenant thresholds and an unusually large number of loans with 
financial measures at or just above covenant threshold.  Therefore, they provide solid evidence that 
managers take actions either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt 
agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations. 
 
Equity Offerings 
 
Share issues provide a direct incentive for management to engage in earnings management as higher 
earnings would result in increased share prices implying an increase in market valuation and a reduction 
in cost of capital.  Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggests that if managers are able to increase reported 
earnings without detection, they can improve the terms of the public offer.  In this way, they are providing 
direct monetary benefits to themselves as well as their firm.  Studies examining equity offerings as an 
incentive for earnings management usually test whether managers manipulate earnings in periods prior to 
initial public offers (IPO) and seasoned equity offerings.  IPOs are highly susceptible to earnings 
management because of the existence of asymmetric information between the investors and IPO issuers.  
As there is no previous market price for shares, management has an opportunity to manipulate earnings to 
increase its introductory price.   
 
Teoh et al., (1998) examine the relationship between underperformance of IPOs in subsequent periods 
and earnings management by using a sample of 1649 IPO firms in USA.  Their study reveals that issuers 
with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock returns in the three years thereafter.  
Their study concludes that the underperformance of firms in years after IPO is largely due to earnings 
management in the year of IPO.  Likewise, Rangan (1998) provides evidence of earnings management at 
the time of seasoned equity offerings.  His study disseminates that at the time of the issue, firms report 
unusually high earnings due to unusually high accruals.  However, in subsequent years, firms report poor 
earnings performance.  Both the studies indicate that a strong association exists between the extent of 
earnings management and subsequent stock returns.  
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Management Buyout 
 
In case of a management buyout, there is downwards earnings management.  In such a situation, 
management faces a conflict as they have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders to get the best price for the 
firm and as buyers, managers would not want to pay a high price.  Hence, managers have an incentive to 
reduce reported earnings prior to the buyout.  DeAngelo (1986) claim that the management of buyout 
firms would understate earnings, as information about the firm’s earnings play an important role in the 
valuation of management buyouts.  She uses a sample of 64 New York and American Stock Exchange 
companies, whose managers proposed to buyout the firm, over the period 1973-1982.  However, 
DeAngelo (1986) finds little evidence that managers of buyout firms systematically select accounting 
accruals to understate reported income in periods before the buyout.  Perry and William (1994) examined 
discretionary accruals of a sample of 175 management buyouts during 1981- 88.  Their findings provide 
convincing evidence of income decreasing earnings management prior to a buyout.  
 
Meeting Targets/Expectations 
 
Financial analysts or management usually forecast firms’ expected earnings prior to year-end.  Degeorge 
et al., (1999) tries to find out whether firms manage earnings in order to meet analyst’s earnings forecasts.  
Their study reveals that firms report abnormally high earnings just to meet or exceed the analyst’s 
forecast.  Kasznik (1999) examined whether managers who issue annual earnings forecasts practice 
earnings management to meet their forecasts.  His study of 499 firm years (366 firms) with management 
earnings forecast issued between 1987 and 1991, reveals that positive discretionary accruals was used to 
manage earnings upwards when earnings were below management forecast. 
 
Reduce (Increase) Regulatory Cost (Benefits) 
 
Regulatory concerns can also induce management to engage in earnings management.  Usually firms that 
are vulnerable to anti-trust investigations or other adverse political consequences or firms seeking 
government subsidy have enormous incentives to manage earnings to appear less profitable.  Jones (1991) 
examines whether regulatory scrutiny increases the likelihood of earnings management by firms 
benefiting from import relief assistance in form of tariff increases or quota reductions.  His study provides 
evidence of firms practicing income decreasing earnings management in order to qualify for import relief 
assistance. 
  
Additionally, Cahan (1992) uses a sample of 48 firms to investigate the effect of monopoly related 
antitrust investigations on firms’ reported earnings from 1970-1998.  His findings suggest that firms 
under scrutiny reported income-decreasing discretionary accruals in the investigation years.  
 
Finally, we have selected these incentives for our study, as these are strong incentives and well 
established in literature.  While the above practices are important incentives driving earnings management 
among firms, numerous other factors give rise to the issue that may be unexplored by academics.  Factors 
that deter earnings management practices among firms are the firm’s internal governance structure, 
previous accounting decisions made by the firm that limit future discretionary choices and the costs 
imposed on the entity should earnings management be revealed (Becker et al., 1998). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this paper, we examine the practices and policies of firms that give rise to earnings management.  In 
order to obtain information about firm policies and practices that is not publicly available, we emailed 
questionnaires to CEO’s of listed companies.  In some cases, where the CEO was unavailable, we 
requested an interview with the company’s CFO.  The respondents completed the questionnaire in the 
P. Rani | GJBR ♦ Vol. 7 ♦ No. 1 ♦ 2013  
 
26 
presence of the researcher.  Researchers were present in case the respondents needed clarification about 
any issues. 
 
In the questionnaire, we had closed-ended questions, whereby the researcher provided a suitable list of 
responses.  This type of questionnaires produces quantitative data.  Closed questions provide little or no 
scope for the researcher to misinterpret the meanings of answers.  For example, if an answer is restricted 
to “Yes / No / Don’t Know” it is easy for the researcher to understand the exact intentions of the 
respondent.  However, it also does not give an in-depth picture of the study, as it is possible that 
respondents had some other answers to the research questions.  That is another reason researchers were 
present before the respondents so they could discuss and note down any other important points that came 
to attention. 
 
Our intended group of recipients for the questionnaire was the management team from each listed 
company.  This is because we felt that a member of the management team would be the best person to 
answer the questionnaire as he/she has access to inside company information.  Managers are in-charge of 
the day-to-day operations of the company and therefore possess more knowledge about their management 
policies and practices. 
 
There are sixteen companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange.  This was our initial sample for 
the study.  The sample was reduced to 14 because one of the listed firms was a financial institution and 
consistent with prior studies financial institutions were excluded due to their unique working capital 
structures.  Another listed company was unavailable for interview and failed to return our questionnaire 
despite several calls and emails. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Management Compensation Incentives 
 
After analyzing information obtained from questionnaires, management compensation is the most 
common incentive for earnings management in listed companies in Fiji.  In order to enhance performance, 
listed companies have in place performance-based contracts for senior managers.  In the entire sample, 
members of the management team are entitled to other incentives apart from normal salary, for instance, 
bonuses, annual salary increments, share options etc.  These additional incentives are based on certain 
performance evaluation criteria.  Generally, Human Resources Department (HR), Board of Directors 
(BOD), senior executives or remuneration/compensation committee, set the criteria for rewards or 
remuneration.  BOD and other senior executives set the KPI’s for the management in 86% of the listed 
companies.  In the other 14%, HR sets the criteria for rewards.     
 
The results in Table 1 show all respondents revealed that performance evaluation criteria for rewards are 
present in the management contracts.  Sales, gross profit, cost, share price and customer listing are the 
basis on which management receives additional rewards.  The achievement of this is significantly 
important to managers.  Profit and sales was the most common benchmark for rewards in the management 
compensation policies amongst all listed companies.  Therefore, if management remuneration is 
dependent upon entity profit or sales for the period, managers may manipulate firm earnings so they can 
reach their sales/profit targets and get additional rewards. 
 
Further, all respondents stated that their respective supervisors monitor management performance on a 
monthly basis.  Criterion such as comparative data, non-financial measures and variance analysis are used 
when monitoring management performance.  According to 21% of respondents, if managers fail to 
perform, they face severe consequences, such as lay-off, non-renewal of contract and demotion.  For the 
remaining 79% firms, there are no severe consequences, except that they will not receive any additional 
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benefits.  A respondent stated that they have implemented a performance management system in their 
firm whereby they ensure that those employees who do not meet their KPI’s or performance expectations 
undergo additional training so that they do their tasks well.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Managerial Compensation Incentive 
 
Managerial compensation incentive issues examined Number of firms 
(/14) 
WHO SETS THE CRITERIA FOR REWARDS? 
Human Resources 
Board of Directors 
Senior executives 
Remuneration committee 
 
FACTORS LIKELY TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE ACHIEVEMENT 
OF REWARDS 
Sales 
Cost 
Profit 
Share price 
Customer listing 
Ratios 
 
CRITERIA USED FOR MONITORING MANAGEMENT 
PERFORMANCE 
Comparative Data 
Nonfinancial Measures 
Variance Analysis 
 
CONSEQUENCES FOR UNFAVORABLE PERFORMANCE 
Non renewal of contract 
Demotion 
Non entitlement of benefits 
Decline in work responsibility 
 
2 
8 
4 
0 
 
 
 
11 
9 
14 
9 
9 
1 
 
 
 
14 
7 
7 
 
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
The figures represent the frequency of responses for each option under the respective criterion. 
 
Borrowing Cost Effects 
 
Table 2 presents the results on borrowing cost effects.  Banks and other financial institutions impose debt 
covenants on the firm’s loan agreements.  From our analysis, it is evident that debt financiers have 
imposed some form of debt covenant on 57% of the listed firm’s loan agreements.  The stipulations 
presented in the loan agreement of these firms are in the form of: restrictions on levels of financing and 
investing activities that the firm can undertake; maintaining debt ratios at a specific level; and restrictions 
on future loan approvals.  To avoid violation of debt covenants, managers have an incentive to increase 
reported earnings.  Results disseminate that 43% of the listed firms did not have a loan agreement with 
anyone.  
 
None of the respondents admitted to violating any debt covenants.  If any of these firms were on the verge 
of violating their debt covenants, they would discuss the issue with their debt financiers to identify other 
possible means of making up for the violation.  If in the future, if firms violate their debt covenants, the 
likely penalties would be immediate repayment, a chance to improve performance or additional cost 
incurred to restructure a loan. 
 
Equity Offerings and Management Buyouts 
 
Equity offerings are probably the least common incentive for earnings management in Fiji.  This is 
because of the highly inactive share market in Fiji.  There is little share trading taking place.  There has 
not been an instance of management buyout in any of the listed Fiji firms.  However, we cannot rule out 
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the possibility as an incentive in the near future.  Usually, management buyout is a method for privatizing 
state owned entities.  A management buyout attempt example in Fiji is the case of Rewa Rice Limited in 
1999 when the government was planning to sell off its shares.  However, management's offer was 
declined. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Borrowing Cost Incentive 
 
Borrowing cost incentive issues examined Number of firms 
(/14) 
HAVE DEBT FINANCIERS IMPOSED ANY DEBT COVENANTS? 
 
STIPULATION PRESENT IN THE LOAN AGREEMENT 
Restrictions on level of financing and investing activities  
Debt ratios to be maintained at a specific level 
Restrictions on future loan approvals 
 
IF FIRM IS ON THE VERGE OF VIOLATING DEBT COVENANT 
Discuss with debt financier 
Do anything to not violate covenant 
Do nothing 
 
PENALTIES IN THE CASE OF DEBT COVENANT VIOLATION 
Immediate repayment 
Cease of loan 
Chance to improve performance 
Negotiations to make it work for both parties 
8 
 
 
1 
6 
1 
 
 
8 
0 
0 
 
 
1 
0 
6 
1 
The figures represent the frequency of responses for each option under the respective criterion. 
 
Meet/Beat Targets/Expectations 
 
Fiji, does not have analysts who forecast or make predictions about firm performance.  Therefore, our 
results solely focus on internal forecasts.  In all the listed firms, Board of Directors, CEO’s and managers 
set targets for various divisions in the company.  Various factors such as past trends, non-financial 
measures, competition levels, demand for products/services and current economic conditions are all 
considered when setting company targets.  “Economic conditions such as devaluation and political 
upheavals in Fiji in the past have led to non-achievement of management forecasts,” commented one of 
the respondents.  With the presence of unpredictable events such as these, managers may not be able to 
meet their targeted expectations and this may lead to managing earnings upwards. 
 
Except for one firm, all other firms experienced significant variances when actual performance was 
compared with forecasted trends.  Most respondents said the variances were due to economic conditions 
in Fiji such as the military coup, devaluation and so forth.  There could be dire consequences for non-
achievement of forecasts by companies such as a reduction in management remuneration and a decline in 
share price if a particular company continually does not meet their targeted company expectations. 
 
One respondent also stated that if management does not meet their forecasted earnings, and they do not 
have a valid reason, their employment is at risk in the company.  This means that to save their 
employment, the managers might have to engage in earnings management.   
 
Reduce (Increase) Regulatory Costs (Benefits) 
 
A number of firms receive some form of assistance from the government such as grants or subsidies.  One 
respondent stated that they receive concessionary rates of duty on capital investments.  Another stated 
they receive tax exemptions on local production of wood chips.  One respondent stated that they had tax 
exemptions upon listing in 2000, however this has expired and they no longer receive any assistance from 
the government.  The results show 79% of listed firms did not receive any form of assistance.  This 
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indicates that only a few listed firms would be inclined to report conservative earnings so that they can 
qualify for subsidies and other grants from government. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Meet/Beat Targets Incentive 
 
Meet/Beat targets incentive issues examined Number of firms 
(/14) 
WHO SETS TARGETS FOR VARIOUS COMPANY DIVISIONS 
Managers themselves 
BOD 
CEO 
Analyst 
 
WHAT FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN SETTING COMPANY TARGETS 
Past trends 
Nonfinancial measures 
Competition levels 
Demand for products 
Current economic conditions 
 
DO PAST TRENDS INDICATE SIGNIFICANT ACTUAL/FORECAST 
VARIANCE 
 
CONSEQUENCE FOR NON ACHIEVEMENT OF FORECASTS 
Decline in share price 
Reduction in management remuneration 
Reduction in market share 
Damage to reputation 
 
12 
6 
4 
0 
 
 
14 
11 
14 
11 
14 
 
 
13 
 
 
5 
1 
6 
2 
The figures represent the frequency of responses for each option under the respective criterion. 
 
Apart from major incentives discussed in the literature, there could be other incentives driving earnings 
management amongst listed firms.  One of these could be for the purposes of job security.  Managers are 
under pressure to perform; otherwise, they are at risk of losing their jobs.  For example, in Fiji, the 
management of Airports Fiji Limited and Fiji Electricity Authority were once fired because of poor 
performance.  In order to retain their jobs, managers have the incentive to manipulate earnings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recent corporate collapses and prior studies have indicated that earnings management is a pervasive 
phenomenon.  Fiji’s weak regulatory environment makes it subject to high level of earnings manipulation 
therefore it becomes important to study earnings management practices in emerging economies like Fiji. 
 
The paper contributes to literature by examining provisions in management policies and practices that 
drive earnings management.  Our analysis revealed that common incentives for earnings management in 
Fiji are management compensation incentive, borrowing cost incentive, incentive to meet/beat 
targets/expectations and increase (decrease) regulatory benefits (costs).  Management compensation is the 
most prevalent incentive for earnings management in Fiji.  The least common incentives were equity 
offerings due to highly inactive share market; and management buyout as this situation is rare among 
listed firms to date.   
 
There could be other incentives for earnings management that has not been addressed in this research.  
We have attempted to examine all the strong incentives that drive earnings management and were 
prevalent in prior literature.  Moreover, the sample size of 14 would be quite small to generalize these 
research findings to all emerging economies.  Further research could focus on private and public sector 
companies in Fiji. 
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